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Introduction
In May of 2008, the U.S. financial crisis was almost a year old, but it was in a sense only
beginning to get scary. We were somewhere between Bear Stearns and Lehman. The actions
in March by the Federal Reserve with the support of the Treasury to help contain the damage
from Bear Stearns had slowed the ongoing “run” on the U.S. financial system but had not
arrested it.
Over the late spring and summer, fear of recession intensified, house prices fell further, and
defaults on mortgages increased, adding to fears about the viability of the rest of the financial
system. This was a period when the gap between our ends and our means was the widest in
the crisis.
Most of the burden for containing the growing risks during these months between February
and October of 2008, the period before Congress passed emergency authority to recapitalize
the financial system and expand the scope of the FDIC’s guarantees, was left to the Federal
Reserve’s lender of last resort authority.
As a result, this is a valuable period to understand both the power and the limits of the lender
of last resort in a financial crisis. What problems in a financial crisis can the lender of last
resort help address, and what problems lie beyond the scope of those tools? What defined
the limits of the Fed’s emergency authority? Why lend beyond banks? Why was the Fed able
to help save Bear and AIG, but not Lehman?
Bagehot’s classic framework for the lender of last resort was elegantly simple. His
prescription reduced over time to its essence was that, in a crisis, the central bank should
lend freely against good securities at a penalty rate.
“A panic,” Bagehot wrote, “in a word, is a species of neuralgia, and according to the rules of
science you must not starve it. The holders of the cash reserve [the central bank] must …
advance it most freely for the liabilities of others. They must lend to merchants, to minor
bankers, to ‘this man and that man,’ whenever the security is good. In wild periods of alarm,
one failure makes many, and the best way to prevent the derivative failures is to arrest the
primary failure which causes them.”
Bagehot’s framework by itself, however, does not provide an adequate guide for many of the
key questions policy makers face in a financial crisis: How broadly should the central bank
lend? How much risk should the central bank take? How much damage should it try to
mitigate? The simplicity of Bagehot’s framework is also challenged when applied to our
more complex financial system where banks are not overwhelmingly dominant, and nonbanks as well as direct funding markets play a key role in the provision of credit to the
economy.
Although the focus here is on actions within the Federal Reserve’s authority, Secretary
Paulson and the U.S. Treasury played a key role in helping shape our overall strategy
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throughout this early period. We consulted closely as the crisis intensified, we worked
closely together in trying to prevent the failures of the investment banks and AIG and to
address problems in the broader funding markets, and we explicitly sought the written
support of the Secretary of the Treasury in using our emergency authority in the Bear
Stearns and AIG interventions.
In this crisis, as in most, we were forced to go well beyond Bagehot. Ultimately the U.S.
government had to deploy a much broader arsenal of emergency authorities, including
guarantees and capital, to break the panic and prevent the collapse of the financial system.
The challenges we faced in this phase of the crisis, before we were able to deploy those more
powerful tools, provide a valuable prism through which to assess the post crisis reforms to
the lender of last resort and emergency powers of the government.
This essay is organized as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Observations on the Fragility of Financial Systems
The Structure of the U.S. Financial System on the Eve of the Crisis
The Limits of the Pre-Crisis Emergency Financial Authorities in the United States
The U.S. Response in the Early Phases of the Crisis
A Framework for Escalation
Interventions for Specific Financial Institutions
Lessons from This Phase of the Crisis
An Assessment of the Emergency Authorities Going Forward: Where Do We Stand
Today?

1. Observations on the Fragility of Financial Systems
Financial systems are inherently unstable and vulnerable to runs. And the U.S. financial
system was particularly fragile on the eve of the crisis.
Financial systems are fragile because they exist to meet two important economic needs—the
need for people and businesses to have a place to hold cash to which they can have access on
demand and without fear of loss, and the need to be able to borrow to finance longer term
endeavors that involve risk. Banks, and entities like banks, exist to provide both functions,
issuing “risk fee” liabilities like deposits to finance “risky” things like loans. This role—
transforming something that needs to be perceived as safe and liquid into something that is
neither—is fraught with risk. If people decide they need the cash because they fear for its
safety, banks do not have the ability to immediately take back the funds they have lent out.
This creates the danger of runs and panics, which can threaten the stability of the financial
system and cause severe recessions.
To mitigate this risk, policy makers in modern economies have tried a changing mix of
prudential regulations and the safety net to reduce the probability that things go wrong. This
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is hard to get right. You can get a sense of the complexity of this challenge in the tragic history
of financial crises and the recurrence of financial panics and deep recessions.
The challenge of building a financial engine that works under the most exacting conditions
is about the design of the regulatory constraints on risk and the safety net for when those
defenses fail. The prudential limits or “defenses” are not built—even at the much higher
levels required today—to be sufficient to prevent failures of any individual “bank” or to
prevent any and all financial crises. This is necessarily the case because to build a prudential
regime where there was no risk of failure would prevent banks from being able to engage in
maturity transformation and lending. The capital regime assumes the existence of a safety
net for the extreme crisis—a set of protections from the central bank and the government
that includes deposit insurance, funding from the lender of last resort, government
guarantees, capital injections, nationalization, or special bankruptcy type regimes for failing
institutions, and a Keynesian arsenal of fiscal and monetary policy tools to limit the severity
of recessions.

2. The Structure of the U.S. Financial System on the Eve of the Crisis
In the decades before the crisis, the United States financial system had gradually outgrown
the various protections that had been put in place after the Great Depression. These
protections—a combination of limits on risk and a safety net composed of deposit insurance
and routine access to loans from the Fed—applied only to depository institutions. Over time,
the commercial banks had lost their dominant share of the financial system. (Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission 2011).
In 2007 they were slightly less than half of the financial system. The rest of the financial
system—investment banks, money market funds, large financial firms like AIG and GE
Capital, large government sponsored mortgage firms—operated outside these protections
and oversight, without effective constraints on risk or the protections of the bank safety net.
The financial system had financed a decades-long rise in household debt and helped fuel a
long rise in house prices. When the housing boom crested and fears of the coming recession
intensified in late 2006, a large part of the U.S. financial system looked vulnerable.
This fragility had built up over a long time but it had been masked by a long period of
economic and financial stability. It was a reflection of the broader imbalances in the U.S.
economy. It had been fed by a set of “beliefs” that funding would remain readily available,
that future recessions would be modest, that house prices would never fall at a national level,
and that the low level of losses in past recessions was a good guide to future losses in the
financial system.
Over time, risk had migrated around the regulatory constraints that applied to banks, and
the market share of the banks declined, and the relative importance of the rest of the system
increased. The supervisory system had not evolved with the market.
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Banks were subject to a complex regime of capital requirements and prudential regulations;
no equivalent system of constraint on leverage was applied to the rest of the financial system.
These different parts of the U.S. financial system were closely integrated, which meant
weakness in one area could spread to other parts of the system.
Overall, the financial system had too little capital to provide a credible cushion against the
rising estimates of losses as the crisis intensified, and the capital that existed was distributed
in ways that made the danger more severe. In general, the capital cushions were thinnest
where the regulations were weakest, funding was less stable, and there was less access to
the safety net. The institutions most dependent on less stable sources of funding and more
reliant on short term funding did not have adequate capital to reassure their creditors as the
crisis intensified.
The capital regime that applied to banks, although more conservative than that which
applied to the rest of the financial system, was also too thin to cover the more extreme
estimates of plausible losses banks might face as the severity of the recession became more
evident. And the capital in the banking system was not sufficient to allow the banking system
to compensate for the failures across the rest of the financial system.
In the United States, there was no entity with the authority to safeguard the stability of the
overall financial system. The provision in the Federal Reserve’s mandate to foster financial
stability did not come with the means to constrain risk outside the banking system. Prior
efforts in the U.S. to strengthen this weak and balkanized oversight structure had foundered
in part because the financial system appeared to work.
This system had proven to be pretty resilient across a range of different, relatively moderate
recessions, market downturns, and financial failures. But this system was less stable, and
harder to stabilize in the extreme crisis. The longer period of relative stability helped create
the conditions for the more extreme crisis by encouraging the migration of risk outside the
banking system to institutions that were outside the safety net.

3. The Limits of the Pre-Crisis Emergency Financial Authorities in the
United States
On the eve of the crisis, the U.S. had a relatively weak set of tools in its arsenal, weak relative
to the nature of risk in the system and weak relative to other major economies.
The financial strength of the United States gave us powerful Keynesian tools. Nominal short
term interest rates were high enough at roughly 5 percent in the summer of 2007 to allow
the Fed substantial room to lower rates as the risks of recession rose. With total debt of the
Federal government at roughly 40 percent of GDP, the United States had substantial fiscal
room to provide temporary stimulus in the form of tax cuts and spending programs. These
tools were essential to helping limit the severity of the recession, but they were not sufficient.
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The U.S. financial arsenal included a well-developed safety net for banks composed of the
Fed’s discount window for lending to banks, the protections of the FDIC’s deposit insurance
scheme. Together these provided strong protections against bank runs.
Importantly, the FDIC could also intervene to manage the failure of a bank. The FDIC’s
resolution regime operated much like the bankruptcy regime for normal business, with the
FDIC improvement that the FDIC could act as the provider of financing during the
restructuring or liquidation and also as the arbiter of how to restructure or dispose of the
assets of the institution. This authority included the ability, in the context of a severe financial
crisis, to guarantee the liabilities of the bank or even the bank holding company, in order to
prevent the failure of a bank, and limit the damage that might be caused to the rest of the
financial system by a default.
These tools, however, only existed for banks, which at that time accounted for slightly less
than half of the financial system. The tools available to manage weakness in the rest of the
financial system were relatively limited.
In 2007, no part of the U.S. government had authority to inject capital into any bank, nonbank, or other part of the financial system. And the United States had no regime equivalent
to the FDIC’s resolution regime for banks to manage the failure of large non-banks, like
investment banks or insurance companies.
The Federal Reserve could only purchase Treasuries and agency securities. Unlike many
other major central banks, the central bank of the United States had only limited authority
to buy municipal government securities, and could not buy corporate bonds, commercial
paper, non-agency ABS, or equities, which limited its ability in a crisis to address a
breakdown in those important funding markets.
The Federal Reserve did have statutory authority that could be used to provide financing
outside the banking system in an emergency. This authority, which had not been used since
the Great Depression, was subject to several conditions. Under Section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act (FRA)2 we could lend to a non-bank, but only if we determined that
circumstances were “unusual and exigent," if the borrower could not access other sources of

12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006). FRA Section 13(3), as in effect in September 2008, provides: “In unusual and exigent
circumstances, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, by the affirmative vote of not less than
five members, may authorize any Federal reserve bank, [to provide loans to] any individual, partnership, or
corporation, [when such loans are] secured to the satisfaction of the Federal reserve bank: Provided, That
before [providing any such loan] for an individual or a partnership or corporation the Federal reserve bank
shall obtain evidence that such individual, partnership, or corporation is unable to secure adequate credit
accommodations from other banking institutions.” The statute does not define its key phrases, “unusual and
exigent circumstance” or “secured to the satisfaction of the Federal reserve bank.” (Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve). In the four years after the section was adopted in 1932, the Fed made a total of 123 loans
totaling just $1.5 million. Section 13(3) was not used again until 2008, 76 years later. See also Mehra (2010)
for a discussion of the Fed’s usage of its emergency powers during the crisis.
2

6

Reflections on the Lender of Last Resort

Geithner

funding in the market, and if the loans could be secured to our satisfaction.3
The Federal Reserve’s emergency lending authority was powerful because it could be used
to help mitigate a broad loss of funding. But it had limited effect in an extreme crisis, one that
extended beyond a need for liquidity. Neither the Fed’s, the SEC's or the FDIC's authority
provided the ability to provide capital to or guarantee the liabilities of non-banks.4

The Limits of the Emergency Authority under FRA Section 13(3)
The emergency authority in the Federal Reserve Act limited the terms on which the Fed
could provide funding beyond the banking system, even during a systemic crisis. Such
funding was available only if certain criteria were met including: (i) “unusual and exigent
circumstances” existed, (ii) the borrower had no access to private funding, and (iii) the loan
was “secured to the satisfaction of the [lending] Federal Reserve bank.” Section 13(3)
provided the authority to lend to non-bank financial institutions, but not to provide capital,
or guarantee creditors against loss. The defining difference between a loan and capital is that
a loan is expected to be repaid, whereas equity capital provides a cushion against losses. This
difference is underscored by the requirement in Section 13(3) that permits the Fed to lend
only to the extent the Reserve Bank was secured as a lender—that is, the Reserve Bank had
to believe that there was sufficient collateral or other protection to provide a reasonable
prospect of full repayment. Because of this limitation, lending under 13(3) could not be made
to carry the power of equity or a guarantee.
The law gave the Fed room for judgment on how to evaluate how much that collateral was
worth, but that discretion was limited. We could decide to take a fair amount of risk, by, for
example, looking at what the firm’s assets might be worth over a longer time frame. We also
had some discretion in deciding what margin of safety we needed against loss. This meant
that we could choose to lend to an institution or an affiliate of an institution that might be on
the edge of failure to allow time for a more orderly liquidation, which generally would
mitigate the damage to the system, but only to the extent we had security sufficient to cover
the value of our loan.
The standard interpretation of the role of funding from the lender of last resort is that
lending can help reduce the risk that the strong become illiquid, but it cannot make viable
the fundamentally nonviable.5
3 In

1991, the Federal Reserve Act was amended to make it clear, in the words of the committee report, that “in
[…] an emergency, the Federal Reserve must be able to ensure the liquidity of the financial system, including if
necessary by the use of advances [loans] to securities firms” (U.S. Congress 1991).
4 The

FDIC did have authority to guarantee the liabilities of bank holding companies.

Madigan (2009) discusses the Fed’s crisis management in light of Bagehot’s dictum—“Traditional central
banking principles also tell us to lend only to solvent institutions and only against good collateral, but
complying with these standards in a crisis is not entirely straightforward.” Cline and Gagnon (2013) assert that
“…federal officials, at least in hindsight, appear to have followed the dictum of Walter Bagehot [], which has
guided central banks for almost 150 years.” Posner (2016) claims that “Before the Dodd-Frank Act, the Fed was
5
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Bagehot’s dictum was that central banks should lend freely at a high rate of interest against
“good” assets. He did not explicitly state that the central bank should only lend to “solvent”
institutions.
The emergency provision of the Federal Reserve Act did not explicitly require a finding of
solvency.6 This acknowledged the practical reality that solvency is hard to determine. 7 A
judgment of solvency depends on the value of the assets of the firm and the strength of its
businesses. These depend on the distribution of expected losses. These values are difficult to
determine in normal times. They are particularly hard to assess in the midst of a crisis, when
funding has eroded, the value of assets has fallen steeply, and the trust and confidence
necessary for a financial institution to function are eroding.
The limiting condition in the Federal Reserve Act—the ability to lend up to, but not in excess
of, the value of the available security, less some margin of safety to protect the central bank
from losses—limits the value of the tool in preventing the failure of a weak financial
institution.
The absence of an explicit solvency test in the Federal Reserve Act has not been interpreted
within the Federal Reserve to mean that the lending tools could or should be used to sustain
firms that are not viable. To lend freely to the nonviable is unlikely to work. And such lending
carries other risks. Among these is the risk it leaves the central bank with large losses. It
could increase moral hazard risks.8 It may take the central bank into policy areas that most
deem the provenance of the fiscal authorities.
The general approach that has defined central bank practice and that certainly affected our
view of what was appropriate was that the lender of last resort facilities should be available
to the relatively strong, even if they were suffering the signs of illiquidity, and generally not
available to those that were at the weaker extreme and thus less likely to be viable.
understood to be the LLR for solvent banks and non-banks. FDIC was the LLR for insolvent banks. There was
no LLR for insolvent non-banks. Porter (2009) argues that—“Section 13(3) grants the Fed expansive authority
in ‘unusual and exigent circumstances,’ without requiring a stringent legal standard be met in order to respond
to crises.” While Mehra (2010) does not definitively conclude that the Fed’s decision not to lend to Lehman was
consistent with its legal authority under Section 13(3), he does concede that the decision as to the sufficiency
of Lehman’s collateral was a decision within its discretion.
6 It should be noted that although the law did not require a finding of solvency then, it does now. Section 1101(a)

of Dodd Frank added a provision: “The Board shall establish procedures to prohibit borrowing from programs
and facilities by borrowers that are insolvent.” 12 U.S. Code § 343(B)(ii).
7 Thomas

Baxter made the useful point that there are other definitions of solvency, such as a failure to pay your
debts as they come due or when the level of capital to total assets falls below a regulatory minimum. See for
example Heaton (2007).
8 Henry

Thornton, who wrote about the lender of last resort in 1802, before Bagehot, explained—“It is by no
means intended to imply, that it would become the Bank of England to relieve every distress which the rashness
of country banks may bring upon them; the bank [meaning the Bank of England], by doing this, might encourage
their improvidence.” (Goodhart 1999).
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One last piece of this framework involves what might be called the implicit or persuasive
powers of the central banks and the government.
In the financial crisis of the early 20th century, before the reforms that followed the Great
Depression, the model for dealing with a dangerous financial failure was for J.P. Morgan or
the New York Clearing House to convene the major banks and convince them that it was in
their collective interest to help rescue the weakest among them. (Gorton 2012). The more
recent example of the deft use of these powers was Bill McDonough’s successful effort in
1998 to put together a consortium of financial firms in order to prevent a disorderly
liquidation of the large hedge fund Long-Term Capital management (LTCM). An important
part of what bank supervisors and central banks can do in a crisis is to arrange a rescue of
the weak by the relatively strong.
This strategy works in situations where the strong are strong enough to absorb the weak. It
is unlikely to work if a whole class of institutions is weak and the entire system fragile.
Putting all this together, the emergency financial powers of the United States on the eve of
the crisis were designed for a bank-dominated financial system, not for the complex financial
system we had in 2007. The tools were more designed to address liquidity problems, rather
than problems of inadequate capital. The powers available to manage the failure of a large
institution were limited to banks and did not exist for the rest of the financial system. Overall,
the system was better positioned to deal with an idiosyncratic shock than a systemic
financial crisis. It had worked reasonably well for the crisis of the previous several decades,
but was not up to the challenge of confronting a classic financial panic.
It’s also worth noting that the U.S. emergency arsenal was, in important respects, weaker
than that available to the authorities in the other major economies. This relative weakness
was partly a function of the fact that most other major financial systems were dominated by
universal banks, while our system limited the activities of banks and divided financial
activities among banks and non-banks. This meant the defenses of prudential regulation and
the safety net applied more broadly in most other economies than in the United States. In
addition, most other central banks had broader standing authority to intervene in a financial
crisis, not just because of the broader reach of their traditional lending facilities, but also
because many had the authority to purchase a much broader range of financial assets than
did the Federal Reserve. This would prove extremely valuable in helping prevent a more
damaging collapse in asset values and in funding markets. Finally, parliamentary systems of
government typically had more ability to legislate additional emergency authority in the
crisis than did the United States system, with its greater separation between executive and
legislative branches and the periodic reality that the party of the President might not control
either house of Congress. In the United States, the President’s authority to deal with a
systemic financial crisis, without action by Congress, was essentially limited to closing the
equity markets and declaring a bank holiday.
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4. The U.S. Response in the Early Phases of the Crisis
By February of 2008, the stability of the financial system was eroding. The Fed had cut
interest rates aggressively. However, monetary policy alone could not address weakness in
the financial system, and the weakness in the financial system limited the effectiveness of
monetary policy in offsetting the slowing economy. On February 13, Congress enacted the
Economic Stimulus Act, which included a $45 billion package of tax cuts for businesses to help
offset the contraction in private demand. The stimulus provided an early if modest support
for the weakening economy.
In addition to the interest rate cuts, the Federal Reserve had taken several actions to provide
funding to banks through the discount window, reducing the interest rate at which banks
could borrow, lengthening the terms they could borrow, and encouraging borrowing by
trying to reduce the stigma of coming to the Fed window. These programs were valuable, but
they were most actively used by foreign banks. Most U.S. banks were not, at that point,
experiencing material funding pressure, and were not eager to risk being thought of as weak
because they borrowed from the Fed. The availability of funding for the Fed on more
favorable terms was not effective in encouraging banks to lend more to the rest of the
financial system. Even at that relatively early point in the crisis, banks were husbanding their
capital and reluctant to lend to the weaker parts of the financial system in the United States.
The funding markets, though still working, were showing signs of strain. The pressures
which had started on the periphery of the financial system, were starting to move closer to
the center of the system.
Several of the major U.S. banks and investment banks and the large foreign banks had raised
capital in the fourth quarter of 2007. This was valuable but not enough. The price of
securities most exposed to the rising mortgage defaults and to the broader risks of an
intensifying recession continued to deteriorate. Assets that were rated AAA and whose
prices had never declined more than a few basis points were down by a five, then 10 percent
and even further.
The weakest parts of the financial system had been trying to reduce their exposure to the
types of assets perceived to be at most risk, and the market was less willing to fund those
assets, and less willing to provide funding to the weaker institutions. There were more
troubling signs of fire sales, fears of additional forced selling, and increases in margin and
haircuts. This dynamic, always dangerous, was feeding on itself. Fear was contagious.
Up to this point, the Federal Reserve had used what you might call the conventional arsenal
of tools. The first test of the emergency authorities, the less conventional tools, came in late
February and early March of 2008. In those weeks, it became harder and harder for non-bank
financial firms to fund their portfolios of assets apart from Treasuries, and the market began
to pull back from the weakest of the independent investment banks, Bear Stearns.
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We didn’t know how bad it might get. We couldn’t foresee how the ongoing “run” might
evolve, and how rapidly and broadly it might spread. We had only limited knowledge about
the potential severity of losses and which parts of the financial system were most exposed
to losses, because of the limited reach of our supervisory authorities and the fundamental
uncertainty that complicated any assessment of the likely depth of the recession and the
incidence of losses.
We did, however, come to adopt what you might call a general framework for thinking about
what should be done and how to balance the many competing objectives that had to inform
strategy in a crisis. I am going to describe this framework, at least as I understood it,
recognizing that my colleagues at the New York Fed, the Federal Reserve Board, and the
Treasury might describe it differently and express it better.
This framework didn’t provide a perfectly clear guide to navigate the challenges ahead. It
had to evolve over time. And, of course, we had to translate this framework into concrete
things that were feasible with the authority we had and the tools we could invent. No plan
survives first contact with a crisis. Ultimately, our actions were determined by what was
feasible in the moment.

5. A Framework for Escalation
Our objective was to achieve a soft landing for the economy, not to try to sustain the
unsustainable. After a substantial increase in borrowing relative to income, a substantial rise
in housing and other asset prices, and a dangerous increase in risk in the financial system,
asset prices had to fall back to earth. There would be considerable financial losses and the
failure of many financial institutions. The Fed could not and should not try to prevent that
adjustment from happening, but we had to try to limit the risk it went too far and caused too
much damage to the economy.
We were constantly weighing two different types of risk. On the one hand, we were
concerned about the risk of doing too much, too soon. To escalate too early and to try to
prevent a necessary adjustment would risk one type of problem: trying to sustain the
unsustainable might add to moral hazard risks and impose long term costs on the economy.
But we were always concerned about the other risk: the risk of falling too far behind the
curve. If we were too tentative or too slow, the run on the financial system might get too
much force and be harder to manage.
The Generally Available Funding Programs.
In deciding how to escalate—how fast and how far to extend the scope of the funding, and
how much risk to take—our focus was on how to preserve the functioning of those parts of
the financial system that were the most critical to the economy. We believed the appropriate
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role of the central bank was to keep the core of the financial system liquid, to try to limit the
risk of a broad fire sale of assets and a substantial overshooting of asset prices.
We used the Fed’s emergency lender of last resort tools to provide a funding backstop to the
parts of the financial system that operated alongside the banking system. Although we
couldn’t use the funding tools to replicate the protections of a guarantee against losses, we
tried to replicate the example from the classic bank runs of the past when banks had placed
gold or silver in the window to reassure depositors that they didn’t need to rush to take their
money out. If financial institutions like investment banks knew they could borrow from the
Fed to replace a loss of funding from the market then they would be less likely to sell assets
into the panicky markets. If the creditors of those institutions knew they had access to the
Fed backstop, then the creditors would be less likely to reduce their exposure to those
institutions.
The typical crisis starts slowly but can accelerate dramatically. You need to try to be
preemptive. If you establish the backstop after the run has too much momentum, then it will
not be effective. The condition in Section 13(3) requiring that the borrower be “unable to
secure adequate credit accommodations from other banking institutions” made it hard to act
as early as might have been ideal. In a sense, the statute required that we wait until there
was an acute loss of funding before lending. We interpreted this to allow us to activate a new
emergency facility if there was a dangerous erosion in funding conditions that created the
possibility of a complete loss of access to liquidity.
As conditions deteriorated and the risk of collapse in markets spread, we deployed a
progressively broader backstop with progressively greater force. In most cases, but not all,
we deployed the new facilities before a particular funding market was shut down or a critical
class of institutions completely lost funding.
Given the structure of the U.S. financial system, constructing a credible funding backstop
required support for different types of financial institutions, like banks, investment banks
and the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), and it required programs that supported
different types of funding markets, like commercial paper and asset back securities. These
two types of programs were what you might call generally available programs, i.e. available
on similar terms for certain classes of firms and financial instruments.
The programs for institutions were made available to banks, which among other critical
functions, provide the foundations of the payments system; to the primary dealers, which in
March of 2008 were a group of 20 of the major banks and investment banks through which
the Fed executed monetary policy and the U.S. Treasury funded the government; and to the
government sponsored mortgage entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which were critical
to the housing finance system.
The programs for funding markets were directed at preserving the functioning of the
mortgage markets, commercial paper market, and the asset backed commercial paper
market. (In addition to these programs which used only the Fed’s lending authority, we
subsequently used a combination of the Fed and the Treasury’s emergency authority to
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revive the asset backed securities markets, markets that were a source of funding for a range
of consumer finance products from credit cards to auto loans).
The arc of escalation went roughly like this: We started with banks and then expanded our
lending programs to include the primary dealers, then moved to the GSEs, and then when
other critical parts of the system were at risk of failure, we moved to backstop the key
funding markets.
Apart from the expanding scope of these programs, over time we also gradually increased
the amount of risk we assumed, by extending the maturity of the loans (as in the case of the
discount window and the Term Auction Facility (TAF), and expanding the range of collateral
we lent against (as in the case of the emergency lending facility for the investment banks and
securities affiliates of the major banks). The terms of the funding, in terms of the price and
the haircuts, were designed to be attractive enough to be valuable in the crisis but expensive
when conditions normalized so as to avoid prolonged use.
This distinction between programs directed at institutions and markets, is somewhat
artificial. The programs for the different funding markets obviously also provided critical
support for the core institutions and helped improve their viability.
These programs eventually covered much of the financial system, but they were not
comprehensive. We had to decide, as will our successors in future crises, how to define the
boundaries of these programs. How narrow or broad should be their reach?
Our approach was to extend them to support only the most critical functions of the system,
not every part of the financial system. We started with banks then moved to primary dealers,
which were a defined class of institutions that were essential to the execution of monetary
policy and the funding of the U.S. government and performed much of the capital-raising and
market-making activities of the U.S. financial system. We did not establish broader funding
programs for insurance companies or for other types of non-bank or specialty finance
companies because we believed they were less critical to the stability of the financial system.
We extended these programs to the broader funding markets when those markets stopped
working well.
The Fed’s generally available lender of last resort funding programs, although essential, were
limited in what they could do. We didn’t fully appreciate the limits of their power until we
got deeper into the crisis. But we knew enough to realize that, even when used creatively,
they would leave a substantial amount of risk with the private markets, including equity
investors in, and creditors to, financial institutions. They could mitigate a loss of funding, but
they could not make up for a lack of adequate capital, and they did not have the force of a
guarantee. They could help keep a viable firm liquid and functioning, but they had limited
power in sustaining the weakest parts of the financial system. Ultimately it took a much
broader mix of guarantees and capital injections—together with a powerful set of monetary
policy action and fiscal stimulus—to prevent the collapse of the financial system.
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At this initial phase of the crisis, we were not operating in a system where the executive
branch had authority delegated by Congress to inject capital, provide broad guarantees, or
nationalize parts of the system. How did we decide the boundaries that defined what the
Federal Reserve should do and could not do? There were no neat and clear lines, and this
was contentious within the Fed. Many within the Fed argued that we should limit our actions
to those necessary to protect the banking system and leave the rest of the challenges to the
Congress and the Treasury. Some believe that in acting beyond those conventional limits we
would risk damaging the Fed’s credibility, add to future moral hazard risk, or make it easier
for Congress and the Executive Branch to delay. We shared those concerns, but Chairman
Bernanke, his colleagues, and I decided it was important to use the authority we had, with
increasingly novel and expansive interpretation of that authority. We believed we had the
responsibility to act to try to keep the financial system liquid, even though that might mask
the severity of the problem and for a time make it harder for the broader U.S. political system
to recognize the need for additional action.

6. Interventions for Specific Financial Institutions
In addition to these broad funding programs for different classes of institution and funding
markets, the Federal Reserve used its emergency authorities to provide additional support
to individual institutions where we believed the failure of that institution would jeopardize
the stability of the broader financial institution.
We considered this in two different contexts, first for the major investment banks, second
for AIG, and then for the auto finance companies.9 In deciding whether to use our emergency
authority to help prevent the failure of an individual institution, we considered several
different questions.
Was the failure of the institution likely to be materially damaging to the stability of the core of
the financial system and the overall economy?
This assessment was a function of the firm’s size, the importance of its role in the funding
and credit markets, its linkages with the rest of the financial system, and the contagion that
might accompany its failure. The risk to the financial system was in turn a function of the
state of the world at that moment in time. Failure of a large non-bank in a relatively stable
world would matter less than the failure of even a more modest sized institution in a very
fragile world. In 2008, Bear Stearns, Lehman, Merrill Lynch, and AIG all posed this risk. This
of course was also the case for the major U.S. banks.

The Fed also used the 13(3) authority in the context of the later “ring fencing” arrangements for Citi and Bank
of America.
9
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In the event of failure that might cause systemic damage, did the Fed have the ability to contain
the damage?
Were the protections that could be provided by the broader provision of liquidity to the
markets or through our general funding facilities powerful enough to contain the risk of a
broader run? If so, then our first instinct was to not intervene to try to prevent the failure of
the specific institution.
How weak was the institution?
If you are not required to determine solvency but should not lend to the nonviable, how
should you decide? Since any severe funding problem will at least raise plausible doubt about
viability, you can’t decide that illiquidity itself is disqualifying. That would render the lender
of last resort meaningless. It would be like saying the Fed could lend only to those who don’t
need it. To judge viability, you have to rely on other things that you can observe and evaluate,
such as the relative degree of concern about the institution’s default risk and its equity value
in comparison to similar institutions. In Lehman’s case, we had the evidence of the prolonged
inability of Lehman to raise capital, to sell assets, to fund its real estate portfolio at values
anywhere close to where it was carrying those assets, and the limited value other institutions
attached to its various investment banking businesses.
Would a loan against the full amount of available collateral prevent default?
The emergency provisions of the Federal Reserve Act, by limiting the amount the Fed could
lend to the value of the available security, were designed to limit the amount of risk the Fed
could take and therefore limit the ability of the Fed to rescue institutions closer to the point
of insolvency. If the assets and businesses of the institution had enough value to support a
loan large enough to prevent failure, then the Fed could act on its own to prevent that failure.
This was the case with AIG. In contrast, if the value of the assets held by the firm were not
sufficient to support a loan large enough to allow it to continue to operate, then the Fed did
not have the ability to act on its own to prevent that failure. In that later case, which was the
case for the independent investment banks, the Fed could use its lending powers to help
support the acquisition of a failing firm by another financial institution, as we did with Bear
Stearns, but in the absence of a willing acquirer or another source of equity capital, the Fed’s
emergency authority alone could not prevent failure.10
What determined the amount of support we could provide to help facilitate an acquisition? As we
demonstrated in the case of the JPMorgan acquisition of Bear Stearns, we could lend against a portfolio of
securities provided the we believed there was a reasonable chance that those assets would ultimately be worth
enough to cover the value of the loan. Since we had a lower cost of funds and could hold the assets over time,
through the recession, we could effectively value the assets at a higher level than might be possible by the
acquiring institution or that the market as a whole might place on those assets during the crisis. This provided
a potentially valuable incentive in facilitating a merger, but that value was limited by the constraint on the
amount of risk we could take. If the gap between the value of the assets as marked on the books of the failing
institution and the value the market ascribed to those assets was large, as in the case of Lehman, then we were
unlikely to be able to close all of that gap.
10
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How did we apply this broad framework in the case of the investment banks and AIG?
With no resolution authority, and no ability to provide capital or guarantee liabilities for
financial institutions that were not banks, the only tool we had available to prevent the
failure of a major non-bank financial institution, until Congress passed the emergency
legislation in October 2008, was the Federal Reserve’s authority. This authority was
designed to reduce the chance that a relatively strong institution would become illiquid, but
because the amount the Fed could lend was limited to the amount of collateral available, this
authority could not ensure that the weakest could remain viable. The generally available
funding facilities, the actions to prevent the failure of the GSEs, and the broader policy actions
to limit the severity of the recession could all help to reduce the risk of failure of the major
financial institutions, but they could only do so much.
This meant that our ability to prevent the failure of a major non-bank depended on the value
of its assets and the strength of its underlying businesses. If the assets and the firm’s capacity
to generate income were sufficient to support a loan that was large enough to prevent failure,
then the Fed’s authority could be used to prevent failure. Where those conditions did not
apply, then our options were limited to trying to facilitate an acquisition of the failing firm
by a stronger institution. We could facilitate an acquisition by lending against a portion of
the assets of the failing firm, as we did in the Bear Stearns’ case and could potentially have
done in the Lehman case, but we could not guarantee the obligations of the failing institution
or inject capital. The presence of a viable buyer depended on the relative strength of the
potential acquirers, the relative attractiveness of the businesses of the failing institutions,
and a rough estimate of the value of its assets. If the failing institution was large, then by
definition the universe of potential acquirers was limited, and this list narrowed as
awareness of the potential severity of the crisis and the recession intensified. The weaker
the failing institution, the less likely there would be a viable buyer.
We viewed Bear Stearns and Lehman though essentially the same framework. Both were too
weak to survive on their own. The failure of either, in the fragile conditions of that time,
would have threatened the stability of the financial system. Both had a mix of existing assets
and businesses that were not considered valuable enough by the markets to enable them on
their own to withstand the losses on their balance sheets. Or to put it differently, estimates
of potential losses were large enough relative to the equity value of the firms to raise
substantial doubt in the market about the ability of both firms to survive as independent
entities and to cover their obligations.
In the case of Bear Stearns, when, together with the Treasury, we undertook the first realtime exploration of our options to prevent the failure of an independent investment bank,
we decided that Bear was too weak for us to be able to lend them enough money to survive.
We made this judgment on the basis of what we could observe in the market, what we
learned about Bear’s businesses and assets on Thursday night and into the weekend as we
were able to examine its books, and by the reactions of the potential acquirers that weekend
as they considered providing capital to or acquiring the firm.
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All this confirmed our belief that the firm did not have assets of enough value to “secure to
[our] satisfaction” a loan large enough to enable it to survive on its own. Although we agreed
to a short term loan to get them to the weekend, we thought to lend into the run would simply
finance the exit of Bear’s existing creditors, while the businesses eroded, along with the
ultimate value of the firm.
When we decided we did not have the ability on our own to prevent Bear from failing, we
were left with two options: (1) to help facilitate the acquisition of Bear by another financial
institution; and (2) to put in place funding facility to help backstop the remaining four
independent investment banks. We chose to do both.
When JPMorgan first proposed that the Federal Reserve assume some of the risk in
preventing Bear’s failure, our initial response, given the exceptional nature of such a step
and the risks involved, was to propose that the Treasury provide a guarantee against any
losses the Fed might face. Secretary Paulson, after consulting the Treasury General Counsel,
determined the Treasury had no authority to provide such a guarantee.
While we were engaged in this discussion about Treasury’s authority, we took a closer look
at the $30 billion portfolio of Bear’s assets which JPMorgan was proposing to leave with us.
Our assessment was that, although there was a chance that in a severe crisis we could lose
money, it seemed likely that we could earn a positive return if we held the portfolio through
the recession. The expected value of the portfolio was slightly positive, allowing us to believe
we could meet the condition in the Federal Reserve Act that we could be “secured to our
satisfaction.” We could have been wrong in either direction. The fact that two-thirds of the
portfolio was composed of securities backed by Fannie and Freddie was important to this
judgment, though of course it would ultimately require substantial government resources to
ensure that Fannie and Freddie could meet their obligations.
This portfolio entailed a modest amount of risk to the Fed. Despite the limited risk to us, this
was valuable to JPMorgan because the capital charge associated with holding those assets
would have absorbed some of the cushion remaining on both its risk weighted and total
capital ratios. This was important because the roughly one-third of the portfolio that was
considered relatively low risk to us—the securities whose underlying risk was backed by
Fannie and Freddie—would still have counted against JPMorgan’s total (non-risk weighted)
capital ratio.
We asked Secretary Paulson to write us a letter conveying his view that acting to help
prevent the failure of Bear was important to the stability of the financial system and
recognizing that any loss born by the Federal Reserve would ultimately be borne by the U.S.
taxpayer. In effect, we established the expectation that if the Fed were to undertake a similar
action in a future case we would ask for a similar statement of support from the Treasury
Secretary.
The events of that weekend in March 2008 had an important impact on how we approached
the events of September.
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There had been very few interested buyers for Bear, in part because of concerns about the
weakness of Bear’s businesses, in part because of the very short time frame in which they
had to act, in part because of its size (even though it was the smallest of the independent
investment banks), and in part because the universe of firms strong enough to be viable
buyers were worried about taking on more risk as the crisis intensified.
In the weeks following the merger announcement, despite the fact that JPMorgan agreed to
stand behind all of Bear’s remaining obligations, Bear continued to lose funding and business
in part because of uncertainty about whether the merger would be approved by Bear’s
shareholders. And, despite our decision to help prevent Bear’s failure and to lend directly to
the remaining independent investment banks, funding conditions for the major investment
banks, particularly Lehman, continued to erode in the weeks and months that followed.
In invoking the Fed’s emergency authorities that March, we crossed a line that had not been
crossed since the Great Depression. We had discussed the risk that our actions that weekend
in March might provide false comfort to the management of and the creditors to the
remaining investment banks. To create the impression of support without the capacity to
provide that support was a consequential step.11 We decided that the benefits of acting to try
to contain the growing crisis justified that risk. And we spent the weeks and months that
followed in a concerted effort to reduce the odds of a more severe crisis. These actions
included: a joint effort by the FRBNY and the SEC to force the major investment banks to
reduce their vulnerability to further erosions in market funding; a sustained though
unsuccessful effort together with Secretary Paulson to get Lehman to raise additional capital
or merge with a stronger institution; Secretary Paulson’s successful efforts to convince
Congress to pass legislation to intervene to, in effect, guarantee the viability of Fannie and
Freddie; continuing effort by the Fed to place the tri-party repo and derivatives markets on
a more stable footing; and effort by Treasury and Fed staff to draft a framework for
additional emergency legislation that would provide authority to inject capital into
individual financial institutions, purchase assets, and “resolve” large failing investment
banks and other financial institutions.
Bernanke, Paulson, and I had decided in March that the system was too fragile to contain the
potential fallout from default by a relatively small investment bank. The rest of the financial
system remained very fragile. Congress provided the authority to prevent the failure of
Fannie and Freddie, but was not prepared to act on additional authority over the course of
the summer.12 As a result, even as the probability of failures of other large non-bank financial
institutions increased over the course of the summer, our limited tools for preventing them
had not changed.

Bagehot had warned about such a risk in writing, “To lend a great deal, and yet not give the public confidence
that you will lend sufficiently and effectually, is the worst of all policies….” Thanks to David Wessel for this
quotation and for reminding me of the richness of Bagehot’s various admonitions. (See Bagehot 1873).
11

While deliberating the early drafts of TARP legislation, Barney Frank said to Hank Paulson “We want to adopt
something that works, but there is resistance within our caucuses.” (Paulson 2010).
12
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Lehman was similar to Bear in the challenges it presented us but different in several respects.
It was larger. It was widely perceived to have a substantially greater magnitude of losses.
Because of its size, the perceived attractiveness of its various businesses relative to its
competitors, and its risks, Lehman, even in a more stable world, would have had a smaller
universe of potential buyers. That universe was even smaller given the fact that the risks of
a deep recession and a more severe crisis were much greater in early September than they
had been in March.
Lehman’s position was perilous in part because of the approach it had adopted over the
course of the summer. In trying to raise capital, it had opened its books to a broad universe
of potential investors and partners. This process of selective disclosure did not increase
confidence. And Lehman’s decision to raise a relatively small amount of capital and not from
a strategic investor with a stronger balance sheet left it very vulnerable.
Going into the weekend of September 13, we hoped we could help facilitate a merger, like
we had with Bear and JPMorgan13, or convince a consortium of the world’s major financial
institutions to either help prevent a disorderly failure as Bill McDonough had ten years
earlier with LTCM, or to assume some of the risk in facilitating a merger. There was no
support for the LTCM option, but we told the two potential acquirers of Lehman that we were
willing to help make it possible for them to leave some of Lehman’s assets behind. And we
made the case to the major banks that it was in their best interest to fund a special purpose
vehicle that would take the unwanted assets. We considered this as a potential substitute for
what we had done with JPMorgan in the Bear acquisition, or as a supplementary source of
financing from the Fed for any deal that could be negotiated.
The events over that weekend gave us a range of additional insight into the potential size of
the losses in Lehman’s assets and the potential value of its various businesses. The market
had long suspected that Lehman had been overvaluing its assets and, beginning in the spring
of 2008, certain investors had begun to go public with their concerns.14
Our initial impression, reinforced over the course of the weekend, was that the economic risk
in Lehman's pool of assets was substantially larger than the Bear portfolio, and that the
financial institutions that were most likely to find value in Lehman’s businesses did not
believe that those businesses had sufficient value relative to the significant risks.
The largest and most contested valuations involved Lehman’s real estate holdings. Following
its failure over the summer to secure a buyer or provider of capital, Lehman announced on
September 10 a plan to spin off $30 billion of its most risky assets into a separate company,
nicknamed “SpinCo,” leaving the “clean Lehman” to be recapitalized. The market was not
willing to acquire these assets at anything close to what Lehman was hoping to receive. It
See BusinessWire (2008) for the press release announcing the details of the JPMorgan Chase Bear Stearns
merger.
13

The actions in early September, to put the GSE’s into conservatorship and other announcements by the firm,
were followed by a new wave of pressure on Lehman, as investors became more concerned about the scale of
potential real estate losses ahead and the vulnerability of other firms to those losses. (See FCIC 2011).
14
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could not sell them at the market price without taking losses that would have been fatal given
the erosion in its equity value. Lehman’s stock fell further, bringing it closer to the edge of
the abyss by the end of that week. (Smith 2008).
Over the course of the weekend, Lehman’s potential suitors cast further doubt about the
value of Lehman’s assets. BoA’s rough estimate, based on data from Lehman itself, was that
Lehman had $60-$70 billion of assets marked well above what they were likely to be worth.
This was surely an opening bid in a negotiation, but it also provided a measure of the extent
of Lehman's losses and the relative weaknesses of its businesses.
Barclays was interested, too, but it made it clear from the beginning that it would not
consider acquiring Lehman unless it could leave behind a large pool of assets that Lehman
had valued at roughly $50 billion. (Paulson 2010) (Sorkin 2009) (Wessel 2009).
Alongside these discussions with potential buyers, we tasked a group of other bankers with
the job of valuing the firm’s assets. On Saturday, the group estimated that Lehman had
overvalued its $58 billion in real estate assets by close to fifty percent and that its private
equity valuations were also highly questionable. (FRBNY 2008). Those banks might also have
had an interest in overestimating those losses since they were aware we might ask them to
assume some or all of that risk. But, in any event, all agreed that overvaluations by Lehman—
and associated potential losses—were substantial.
By Saturday afternoon, BoA had decided Lehman’s capital hole was too deep and that it was
more fragile and less valuable than Merrill. In contrast to Lehman, which BoA said it would
not consider buying without being able to leave behind those $60 billion of the riskiest
assets, BoA agreed to pay $50 billion to acquire all of Merrill’s assets and liabilities without
the Fed assuming any of the risk.
Barclays was then left as the only potential buyer for Lehman, but on the condition that it
could leave behind a substantial pool of the riskiest assets, which the private consortium had
tentatively agreed to fund. When the British regulators refused to waive a London Stock
Exchange requirement that Barclay’s shareholders approve an open-ended guarantee of
Lehman’s trading book during the pre-closing period, which would have entailed a
dangerous 30-60 days of uncertainty, Barclay’s asked whether the Fed would provide a full
guarantee of Lehman’s trading book.
We considered whether we could do so, but our lawyers determined that the Fed had no
legal ability to provide such a guarantee.15 Although the British authorities did not say it
explicitly to us at the time, they made it clear in accounts written after the crisis that, at the
Although in this instance, the financing had been secured by the private consortium’s agreement to fund Lehman’s
real estate assets, the guarantee was still critical to forestall a run between signing and closing. Barclay’s could not
guarantee Lehman’s trading book without a shareholder vote and the Fed had no authority to issue an open-ended and
unsecured guarantee. See Baxter (2010a) regarding the importance of a third-party guarantee of Lehman’s operations
and the likely negative prognosis for the company without one.
15
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time, they deemed Lehman too close to insolvency to risk burdening an already weak
Barclays. They interpreted our indications that we could not provide a guarantee as further
indication that Lehman was too weak. They did not want to import the “American cancer.”
(Paulson 2010).
With Barclays out of the picture, and no other interested buyer on the horizon, we were out
of options to prevent Lehman’s failure.16 Just as we had concluded with Bear, our judgment
regarding Lehman was that the combination of the fragility of its businesses and the scale of
losses in its assets meant that we could not provide them a loan large enough to save them.
To lend on that scale, we believed, would not have been effective and would have been
outside any reasonable interpretation of the scope of our emergency authority.17
As in the case of Bear, we believed that lending into the ongoing run would just finance the
exit of other creditors, fail to arrest the collapse in confidence in the institution, and erode
the ultimate value left for the rest of the creditors, all without improving the odds that a
viable buyer would emerge. The company’s unsuccessful efforts over the previous six
months to attract a suitor or raise sufficient capital, the market’s perception of the extent of
the financial weakness of Lehman,18 combined with the intensity of the pressures on the rest
of the financial system, meant to us that a strategy of lending to buy time would not work.
Because we could not inject capital into the firm or guarantee its liabilities and had no ability
to run the type of “resolution” or quasi bankruptcy process the FDIC had the authority to use
for banks, we were out of options to prevent Lehman’s failure.19
We coordinated with the SEC to devise a “Plan B” in this event. The plan was to have the broker-dealer, their
main U.S. operating entity, continue to operate with funding from the Fed to wind down its book, since, at a
smaller size, a SIPC proceeding would be more orderly. And this is essentially what happened with the SIPC
proceeding commencing on September 19, helped along by Barclay’s acquisition of most of the firm’s assets.
16

As noted above, although we did not believe we had the legal ability to save all of Lehman on our own, we did
have the ability to lend against the collateral they held in their U.S. broker-dealer which had not been included
the parent’s bankruptcy filing. We did lend to the broker-dealer on a substantial scale after the holding
company filed for bankruptcy to help reduce the risk of a larger, immediate liquidation.
17

Even ten years after its bankruptcy there is no consensus regarding Lehman’s solvency or the size of its capital
hole. Anton Valukas, the court-appointed bankruptcy examiner determined after extensive analysis and
assistance from advisors, that “[u]tilizing a market‐based approach” there was “sufficient evidence to support
a finding of insolvency of LBHI [the parent company] beginning on September 8, 2008,” and perhaps as early
as September 2nd (Valukas 2010, 1973). Duff and Phelps who looked at Lehman’s assets for the bankruptcy
examiner, determined on an implied asset value basis that Lehman was insolvent on various days during the
summer 2008 and valued its net worth at approximately -$35 billion immediately before its bankruptcy filing
(Valukas 2010, 1578-80). Also see Ibid. Appendix No. 21: LBHI Insolvency Analysis for more detail). The FDIC,
in considering the hypothetical application of its new orderly resolution process for non-bank institutions
calculated it as -$5 billion. (FDIC 2011). The estimates of others have also varied widely. Even Ball (2016), who
has vigorously criticized our actions (or inaction) calculated Lehman’s net worth between -$2 billion and $13
billion (assuming its subordinated debt would not be wiped out). Notably, Cline and Gagnon (2013) reached
the largest estimate at -$100 billion to -$200 billion.
18

In responding to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Chairman Bernanke expounded on our reasoning—
“the credit relied on by Lehman to remain in operation was in the hundreds of billions of dollars and the lack
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Even if we could not prevent failure, the law gave us the ability to lend to an institution or an
affiliate of an institution that might be on the edge of failure to allow time for a more orderly
liquidation, but only to the extent we had security sufficient to cover the value of our loan.20
We were able to act to help prevent a precipitous liquidation of the broker-dealer because
Lehman’s U.S. broker-dealer affiliate was much smaller than the firm as a whole, its liquidity
needs were smaller, and we concluded that the value of the collateral held in that entity was
sufficient to cover its immediate funding needs. The funding that we provided to the brokerdealer under the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) and other facilities after Lehman’s
bankruptcy filing meant that this smaller entity could continue to close out its trades for a
few more days, shrinking the firm and moving towards a more orderly liquidation.21
Some have contended that Lehman was nominally solvent and therefore we could have lent
it enough money for it to survive. As discussed earlier, the absence of an explicit solvency
test in the Federal Reserve Act does not mean that the lending tools should or could be used
to sustain firms that are not viable. To lend freely to the nonviable carries many risks.
Moreover, a simple crude “solvency” test by itself, even if such tests were feasible during a
panic, is not an adequate basis for a decision to lend.

of confidence that led counterparties to pull away from Lehman suggested that Lehman would need a credit
backstop of all its obligations in order to prevent a debilitating run by its counterparties. Moreover, the value
of a substantial portion of assets held by Lehman, especially its investments in RMBS, loans, and real estate,
was falling significantly. Derivative positions were subject to continuing collateral calls that required amounts
of Lehman funding that could not easily be quantified in advance. And clearing parties were demanding
collateral as a condition for serving as an intermediary in transactions with Lehman. We saw no evidence that
Lehman had sufficient collateral to support these types and amounts of taxpayer support from the Federal
Reserve […] Moreover, without a potential buyer for Lehman, the Federal Reserve could not be certain how
long it would be required to fund Lehman or what the ultimate source of repayment, if any, would have been.”
(Bernanke 2010).
Baxter (2010a) asserts the importance of a third-party guarantee of Lehman’s operations and the likely
negative prognosis for the company without one.
Baxter improves on this formulation, explaining that “to be secured to our satisfaction” traditionally required
that we have a “first priority perfected security interest in eligible collateral with a lendable value [after a
haircut] which exceeds the amount of the credit extended”−to provide some margin of safety that would be
greater than or equal to the amount lent. (Anand 2016).
20

Lehman’s broker-dealer borrowed under the PDCF but was subject to two additional terms that took into
consideration its unique situation that its parent would be in bankruptcy-(i) steeper haircuts and (ii) the need
to certify that assets pledged to the PDCF by LBI on September 15th had been owned by it on September 12th
and not transferred to it by the parent after that date. (Baxter 2010b). We did not “cut off” the Lehman parent
from borrowing from the PDFC, as some critics have stated. The holding company was never eligible to borrow
from the facility, nor was any other parent of a primary dealer. (Ibid.). The broker-dealer borrowed between
$40 and $60 billion a day, across 3 different facilities: the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), the PDCF,
and the Open Market Operations from September 15 through September 18, 2008. (A repo is functionally a
secured loan). (Ibid., Valukas 2010, 1536).
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Even using a generous view of the value of Lehman’s assets, the losses were in the range of
tens of billions of dollars.
Of the firm’s roughly $600 billion in liabilities, only about a fifth was long-term subordinated
debt, and thus not runnable. Absent a legal resolution or bankruptcy regime, we could not
magically turn that long-term debt into equity to absorb the losses. The rest of the liabilities
might bleed away, some quickly, some slowly.
If we had been willing to commit to lend hundreds of billions of dollars to cover all the
liabilities, or even “just” the $500 billion that were not long-term subordinated debt, would
that have that been effective in making the firm viable? That seems extremely unlikely.
If the Fed had assumed all the risk in lending to Lehman, and we had to replace the holders
of $500 billion of runnable debt, would we have been able to capture the remaining value in
Lehman’s assets and businesses ahead of the other claimants to those assets, and would that
value be sufficient to cover our exposure? In the extreme case, the Fed would be the holder
of assets previously valued at $600 billion but now worth substantially less, having paid out
the $500 billion of Lehman’s other obligations and with the core business of the bank deeply
damaged. That would then become a liquidation exercise, with uncertain remaining assets
to back our claims and the claims of the $100 billion of long-term debt holders. Of course, in
reality, many of Lehman’s assets were already encumbered, and there was no reliable way
to estimate the value of the rest.
We were willing to take substantial risk, as we decided to do roughly a day and a half later in
the loan to AIG. In the case of AIG, however, we believed there was a reasonable chance that
AIG’s assets in the form of its insurance businesses around the world were stable enough
and valuable enough to support a loan large enough to prevent default. Even in that case,
however, the Fed had to increase the total size of its commitment and Treasury had to inject
capital bringing the total commitment by the government to $185 billion before things
stabilized. Ultimately, the underlying businesses proved quite resilient and profitable, and
the tax-payer earned a profit of $23 billion on that package of assistance.
In the Lehman case, without a willing buyer and without access to a resolution regime like
the FDIC’s regime for banks, we believed that to lend on a scale necessary to save it would
be outside the limits of what we could do. The limits on the amount we could lend rendered
the tool inadequate to the challenge of preventing the failure of an investment bank in the
process of a run. To lend in that context would have been a proverbial bridge to nowhere.
Would a loan to buy time have been helpful in limiting the damage, even if it simply delayed
rather than prevented failure?
Perhaps, but I think this is unlikely. We saw in the Bear case how funding continued to bleed
away and Bear’s businesses continued to erode, even after JPMorgan announced the
commitment to acquire Bear. That changed only with a fully credible guarantee from
JPMorgan, but at that point a lot of damage had been done. To lend ineffectively, without

23

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 1 Iss. 1

stabilizing the firm and without credibility preventing failure, would not have been
reassuring to a market at the edge of panic.
Of course the central bank should be prepared to take losses. In fact, it is highly likely given
all the risk and uncertainty in panics that the appropriate use of the lender of last resort
authority might well result in some losses. The greater the risk of contagion from default, the
more risk a central bank should be prepared to take. But that is not an argument for lending
freely to the nonviable, even in a panic.
Some suggest that if we had been willing to commit earlier to lend against a large pool of
Lehman’s riskiest assets that we would have encouraged more firms to come forward as
potential buyers of the rest of the firm. This is possible, but not likely, given the magnitude
of the risky assets Lehman held, the limits on what the Fed could lend against, and the general
weakness of the universe of Lehman's potential acquirers. The fact that no other willing
buyer came forward in the summer or that weekend with a credible ability to absorb
Lehman, even with the prospect of an arrangement like JPMorgan’s with Bear, illustrated the
limits of what was possible.
Is it possible that if we had lent to investment banks earlier and more generously starting in
the summer of 2007, that we could have diffused the risk of the panic before it spread far and
wide?
For this to have been sufficient you would have to believe that the weakest of the investment
banks were still viable, solvent but illiquid, and simply victims of broader forces beyond their
control. There is little basis for believing this. In early 2008, Lehman and Bear reported total
assets of roughly 33 times their common equity.22 Both firms had funded those assets with
short-term obligations, the type of funding most likely to run when things got scary, which
is exactly what happened. They ran businesses that seemed viable and profitable in a boom,
when liquidity was cheap and available, but were not designed to withstand a less benign
environment. They were too late to recognize this reality and to adjust course.
Confidence in Lehman eroded dramatically in the weeks after Bear’s near failure in March
2008, even though we had established the PDCF to provide backup liquidity to the
investment banks in the event that they experienced a situation similar to Bear. 23 In
September, confidence eroded in Goldman and Morgan Stanley, even after we expanded the
terms of that facility on the Sunday night of Lehman’s failure to accept any type of security
that could have been used in the tri-party repo market, including collateral located overseas,
thus providing a fuller backstop for funding that ran from any part of the firms.

22 See Lehman Brothers’

SEC Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2008 (Lehman Brothers 2008) and Bear
Stearns’ report for the same period. (Bear Stearns 2008).
23 We

had also established the TSLF which accepted securities that could no longer be used as collateral in the
repo market and exchanged then for Treasuries which the firm could still borrow against. (Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve Website).
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A variant of this argument—that if we had deployed our existing authorities sooner and
more aggressively, things would have been different—is that if we had agreed to allow all
investment banks to convert to bank holding companies earlier, they would have been able
to benefit from the halo effect of Fed support and would have survived. We can’t fully know
the answer to this, but the balance of evidence doesn't support that judgment.
Lehman had asked late in the summer whether we would consider making them a bank
holding company on the theory that it would give the impression of greater access to funding
from the Fed. Given the erosion in Lehman’s financial position, we did not think that would
be effective, in part because it wouldn’t in practice materially change the degree of funding
from the Fed, and to create the perception of protection without the reality would be
ineffective.
After Lehman’s failure, the Fed did agree to make Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs bank
holding companies on September 21, but only on the condition that they raise a substantial
amount of outside capital from private sources. They were able to do this, but even with that
additional equity capital, and even after giving the market the impression that Morgan and
Goldman were more securely under the Fed’s protection, both banks remained perilously
close to failure until, using the newly granted authority of the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act, Treasury injected capital into them, and they were able to issue new debt
with a full FDIC guarantee. (Dealbook 2008). (Geithner 2014). (Avraham, Selvaggi, and
Vickery 2012).
Was Lehman the cause of the broader panic, or was it more the symptom of the broader forces
that caused the panic?
Because of Lehman’s size and the timing of its failure, many people believe that Lehman was
the cause of the panic that followed. Although the initial market reaction to Lehman’s failure
was limited, conditions deteriorated rapidly over the course of the next several days.
Lehman’s default led to the Reserve Primary Fund’s decision to “break the buck” as a result
of significant losses in Lehman commercial paper. The Reserve Primary Fund’s “breaking the
buck” led to a general run on prime money market funds. Money market funds withdrew
funding from other investment banks, non-bank financial institutions, and other foreign
banks. The actions by the Lehman administrator in London to seize collateral in prime
brokerage accounts led to a general flight by hedge funds and other financial firms from
other investment banks and broker-dealers. Lehman’s failure and AIG’s near failure, both
coming soon after the actions to put Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship, raised the
probability of failure of other financial institutions. The crisis spread later that week to the
weakest of the major U.S. banks, WAMU and Wachovia.
We hoped the damage would be less severe, given how much time the markets had to
prepare for failure, but we feared it would be terrible. 24 Lehman’s bankruptcy obviously
The progressive erosion in Lehman’s financial position over the course of the summer was in effect the
impact of its counterparties and investors preparing for the possibilities it would not survive. (See FCIC 2011).
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made a fragile situation worse, but its failure was more a symptom of the broader breakdown
of the financial system than the fundamental cause of that breakdown. The financial system
had already been experiencing a slow, less visible run for more than a year. The much larger
AIG, Fannie and Freddie, and Merrill Lynch had all arrived at the edge of collapse at roughly
the same time as Lehman, not as a result of Lehman’s failure.
A common framework people use in trying to understand crises is that of dominoes or
contagion. But the agent of causality in a systemic financial crisis is rarely the direct losses
caused by a large failure. Ed Lazear’s preferred metaphor is of popcorn on a stove or in a
microwave. The growing heat, a reflection of the intensifying recession, causes the popcorn
to pop, and then more firms to fail.
This is closer to reality than the domino or contagion metaphors of crisis, but it’s not quite
right. The better explanation is that as the scale of losses, actual and expected, increase, more
institutions are pushed closer to the edge of collapse. The market, not able to differentiate
fully, pulls back from all that look potentially vulnerable. The failure of one raises the implied
probability of the failure of other firms considered similarly exposed to losses from a
deepening recession.
When market participants cannot discern the scope of the official safety net, in terms of the
types of institutions that fall within it, or they do not understand the limits of that safety net
in preventing failure, then the chances are greater that panic escalates with the unexpected
failure. In this sense, an important consequence of Lehman’s failure was that it changed
beliefs about what type of institution the Fed and the government had the power or the
intention to save. This mattered at the time, but it was not the most important effect. The
crisis intensified after Fannie and Freddie were placed into conservatorship, and it
intensified after the Fed announced it would lend to AIG, although both actions prevented
default and dramatically limited the losses on the broader financial system. By highlighting
the fragility of some of the largest financial institutions in the world, each of which had been
rated among the safest of any of the major financial institutions, the fact that the government
and the central bank had to intervene to prevent their failure eroded confidence in the rest
of the financial system.

7. Lessons from This Phase of the Financial Crisis.
This phase of the crisis from the late winter to the early fall of 2008 offers some important
lessons for the design of financial systems and for crisis management.
Perhaps most important, it illustrates the dangers of allowing the prudential safeguards to
erode and allowing financial systems to evolve beyond the perimeter of the prudential
constraints. In any risk-based capital system, a long period of relative stability will reduce
estimates of future losses and erode the protection provided by the capital regime. If you
wait too long to remedy this, you will lose the chance to force institutions to raise private
capital, and place more of the ultimate burden for the rescue on the taxpayer. If you allow
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firms to issue deposit-like, “safe” liabilities and to engage in maturity transformation in
competition with banks but without being constrained by limitations on leverage and
funding, then over time the market share of the more easily defended parts of the system
will decline, and the relative size of the rest of the system will expand. In the extreme crisis,
the overall financial system will be fragile and harder to stabilize, with greater damage to the
economy.
A second painful lesson from this phase of the crisis is the dangers of running a financial
system with an outdated and limited arsenal of financial tools.
Lending facilities are an inadequate defense against financial panics. To make it more likely
that the financial authorities are able to avoid the savage economic damage of extreme crises,
they need to be equipped with the ability to guarantee liabilities, inject capital, and to manage
the failure of large institutions through resolution authority, conservatorship, or
nationalization. If those tools are not available or require legislation in the moment, then the
odds of a more severe crisis are much greater.
The mix of funding, guarantees, and capital that were essential in the last financial crisis will
be as important in future financial crises. The absence of any one of these tools cannot
practically be compensated for by the presence of the others. The tools of the lender of last
resort are not alchemy. Liquidity support alone is a poor substitute for capital. There’s no
realistic amount of liquidity that can fully reassure creditors in a panic. The typical lending
facilities of central banks, lending against collateral with a haircut to market value to provide
a margin of protection, cannot provide protection equivalent to an explicit guarantee.
A market where prices reflect fire-sales induced by runs can make in the more conservative
capital buffers of today perilously thin. In the absence of an effective mix of monetary policy
to lower interest rates and fiscal policy to help offset the risk of collapse in private demand,
even substantial amounts of capital and funding protections can be overwhelmed.
The perimeter of the safety net in a crisis has to be broad enough to cover the core of the
financial system, even if parts of the financial system lie outside the scope of the formal
perimeter of prudential regulations.
And to be effective, a great deal of freedom and discretion in how to use this arsenal of tools
is needed, ideally with some independence from the inevitable pressures of politics, given
the fog of uncertainty that prevails in a crisis, the speed with which things can shift to panic,
and the need for experimentation and adaptation as events develop.
A credible arsenal has to be able to manage the full spectrum of crises, from the idiosyncratic
to the systemic. The responses necessary to confront the full continuum of bad things that
can happen are very different.
This phase of the crisis also offers some important lessons for crisis management.
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No plan survives first contact with the messy uncertainty of a systemic financial crisis. The
dynamics of contagion are not predictable. There is no bright line between the insolvent and
the merely illiquid, and therefore no purely objective, well-established set of rules for triage
among firms. There is no clearly visible threshold between a necessary adjustment in asset
values and a few failures of financial firms, and a full-scale financial panic.
We have and we will inevitably in the future experience a wide variety of financial shocks,
from the relatively benign to the extreme, from the idiosyncratic to the systemic. They
require different solutions. The basic strategy that makes sense in most crises is different
from what is necessary in a broader panic. What is conventionally indicated in dealing with
banks that are failing for idiosyncratic reasons will, in conditions where the system is fragile,
make panics worse. Failures of the weak and losses imposed on creditors, normally a good
and necessary thing, can be too much of a good thing when the system itself is subject to
failure.
In a fragile financial system, where solvency is in question, the failure of even relatively
modestly sized institutions can lead to runs on the relatively strong, because of the difficultly
in knowing the severity of losses relative to capital in similar institutions. Default by one will
raise estimates of the probability of default by others.
Market expectations of the scope and flexibility of official support play an important part in
the dynamics of runs, as do market expectations about the treatment of creditors.
In panics, the core challenge is to reduce the incentive for creditors to run and for financial
institutions to withdraw credit from the economy en masse. Policy should be directed at that
objective, or you risk setting in motion the incendiary forces that can produce economic
depressions. It is hard to know in the moment how vulnerable the system is to panic and
runs. You may not know it unless/until you are in midst of the run. You have to feel your way,
allowing adjustment and failure, weighing and assessing and trying things until you come to
the point where you believe the core of the financial system is in jeopardy. This diagnostic
challenge is central to the problem of designing strategy in a crisis.
If you have full degrees of freedom in terms of the emergency arsenal of financial tools, and
the conditions suggest substantial risk of panic, then you want to err on the side of being
aggressive sooner in providing credible protection against the catastrophic risk. That is a
function only governments and central banks can provide. To do this requires clear
expectations around the extent and limits of the reach of the safety net, recognizing the limits
of what the lender of last resort authority alone can do, and providing the full complement
of backstop and guarantees that are necessary to definitively arrest a run. The focus should
be on preserving broader market functioning, and protecting the stability of the essential
core of the financial system, not in preventing the failures of individual firms at the weakest
end of the solvency continuum. If you have an arsenal of tools to prevent/contain contagion
and panic, then you can more safely allow the failure of the weakest.
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8. An Assessment of the Emergency Authorities Going Forward:
Where Do We Stand Today?
The Prudential Defenses Are Much Stronger
The post-crisis financial reforms in the U.S. include much more conservative constraints on
risk taking, with tougher capital and liquidity requirements. These are applied across a much
larger part of the financial system. The largest institutions, whose failure would be more
damaging, are subject to tougher constraints relative to risk than smaller banks. Stress
testing is an integral part of the new capital regime. The higher capital requirements will
provide protection against more extreme losses and a much greater range of potential crises.
To a much greater degree than before the crisis, the capital regulations are supplemented by
requirements for more conservative funding. These new prudential regulations can be
extended beyond the banking system to other institutions. The limitations on individual
institutions are complemented by clearer authority to establish margin requirements in repo
and derivatives.
The structure of the U.S. financial system, however, still allows more opportunities for
arbitrage around these constraints, and banks are a smaller share of the U.S. financial system
than of the other major economies. Although substantially more conservative than the precrisis regulations, they were not designed to provide protection against the most extreme
crisis. Losses in the latest recession were high, but they would have been much higher
without the forceful use of monetary policy and fiscal policy. It will take a long period of good
policy choices and benign economic conditions for the Keynesian arsenal to be restored to
the level where it could provide the same forceful response as in this past crisis. Over time,
if we have another extended period of relatively stable economic conditions as in the period
before this crisis—the “Great Moderation”—markets will again be willing to finance a
substantial amount of maturity transformation with leverage outside the banking system,
and this process will erode these protections.
The Emergency Arsenal is Weaker.
The financial reforms have left the U.S. with a weaker emergency arsenal relative to most
other major economies. On the positive side, the new resolution regime combined with much
higher total-loss-absorbing capital requirements provide better tools for managing the
failure of a major investment bank like Lehman in a less messy way than default and
liquidation. On the negative side, many of the tools that were essential to resolve this crisis
have been eliminated or curtailed.
The FDIC’s ability to guarantee the broader liabilities of large complex bank holding
companies has been limited and now requires Congressional authorization.
The Treasury’s ability to use the Exchange Stabilization Fund to guarantee money market
funds has been eliminated.

29

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 1 Iss. 1

The Fed’s emergency lending authorities have been curtailed. The Fed can no longer use the
provisions of 13(3) to lend to a single institution as we did to facilitate the acquisition of Bear
Stearns and to prevent the failure of AIG. These provisions can still be used to lend to a broad
class of institutions, like we did for the primary dealers, or important funding markets, like
the commercial paper markets. New disclosure requirements may make it less likely that
eligible institutions will make use of these authorities because of stigma, which will limit
their value at the point when they are most important.
The new resolution authority provides an elegantly designed solution to help limit the
damage caused by the failure of a large complex financial institution, by limiting the scope of
default to the obligations of the parent, allowing the operating subsidiaries, such as the banks
and broker dealers underneath the parent, to continue to operate, and ensuring funding for
the resolution would be available (the ultimate costs of which would be borne by the banking
industry not the taxpayer). The new regime also allows for a brief stay on derivatives and
other financial contracts. And by allowing the FDIC to leave behind the long term debt
obligations of the parent to absorb losses, it creates a larger cushion of contingent equity
ahead of the deposit insurance fund.
For institutions that are subject to the much higher capital requirements, this is a very
promising approach for managing a large failure. We won’t know how effective this will be
until it is used. And with all its promise, it has some essential limitations.
Although it provides a potentially effective way to deal with the idiosyncratic crisis, the
failure of a large institution in an otherwise relatively stable system, it was not designed for
the systemic financial crisis, where the number of institutions at risk of failure is large, and
the system is at the edge of panic. As we saw in 2008, interventions to prevent default by a
large institution could still increase fears of the failure of others. And, as we also saw in 2008,
imposing losses on the creditors of a bank in a crisis will tend to broaden and accelerate the
run.
The scope of the higher capital requirements is not comprehensive and does not apply to
significant parts of the banking system or to non-bank financial institutions. Resolution
authority applied to these institutions would very likely entail default on some part of the
failing firm’s obligations.
Without the FDICs guarantee authority, the ability of the Fed to help facilitate the acquisition
of failing financial institutions by using 13(3), and the ability to inject capital into parts of the
financial system, the resolution authority alone is an inadequate defense against the extreme
crisis.
Overall, the combination of the new constraint on risk-taking and the new resolution
authority provides a better system than we had before the crisis for confronting less severe
financial trauma. The higher capital requirements and more conservative funding should
also help reduce the probability of the systemic financial crisis. But the new regime will not
enable our successors to contain the damage to the economy from an extreme crisis or to

30

Reflections on the Lender of Last Resort

Geithner

break a classic financial panic. To do that, they will be required to request new authority
from the Congress to provide guarantees and inject public capital into the financial system.
This new system of prudential safeguards and stronger resolution authority would be more
effective for bank-dominated financial systems. It is less effective in the more complex
financial systems of the United States, where the reach of both the constraints on risk and
the reach of the safety net are more limited, a diverse mix of financial institutions can operate
outside those limits, and the economy relies on a mix of other funding sources that do not
depend on the balance sheets of banks.
Over time, it would be prudent for the United States to build a stronger emergency financial
arsenal, with greater discretion for the Fed, the FDIC, and the Treasury, to provide the
protections in a crisis that the market cannot provide on its own.
If we are to have a credible chance of limiting the probability of the potential damage caused
by future crises, the U.S. needs a stronger arsenal of tools and more discretion in how to
deploy those tools.
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Appendix: Chronology
TLSF. On Tuesday, March 11, 2008, the Fed announced the Term Securities Lending Facility,
which would allow primary dealers to exchange their holdings of agency securities for
Treasuries. This facility helped mitigate the impact of the emerging illiquidity of GSE
securities. The market’s reaction to the announcement was mixed. Whatever reassurance it
brought was clouded by the view that it was designed to help Bear Stearns and by fears that
our action reflected alarming concern about funding pressures on the major investment
banks and more broadly.
Bear Stearns. On Friday, March, 14, we announced a back-to-back loan through JPMorgan
to Bear Stearns to help Bear survive to the weekend. That Sunday, March 16, we announced
that the FRBNY would take on a $30 billion portfolio of Bear’s assets to help facilitate
JPMorgan’s acquisition of Bear. This marked the first use of Section 13(3) since the Great
Depression. When JPMorgan raised the price it would pay for Bear, we renegotiated our
agreement with JPMorgan so that they would absorb the first $1 billion of any loss on that
portfolio.
PDCF. Also on Sunday, March 16, 2008, we established the Primary Dealer Credit Facility
(PDCF) to allow the Fed’s 20 broker dealers to borrow from the FRBNY against a set of
relatively high-grade collateral. Primary dealers used the PDCF like depository institutions
used the Fed’s discount window, which provided these primary dealers with a liquidity
source when funding was scarce.
The four remaining investment banks. FRBNY began informal “monitoring” of four
remaining independent investment banks in cooperation with the SEC. In the weeks
following the establishment of the PDCF, the FRBNY assigned teams to examine the liquidity
positions of these financial firms. Our objective was to encourage them to move to adopt a
stronger liquidity cushion, and reduce the risk they took false comfort from the new Fed
backstop. This gave us more insight into their relative vulnerabilities and allowed us to see
first-hand the ongoing erosion in Lehman’s funding over the course of the following months.
IndyMac. FDIC intervened in the California thrift IndyMac after the bank failed on July 11. At
the time of failure, IndyMac had approximately $32 billion in assets. All general unsecured
creditors, subordinated debt, and stockholders were completely wiped out. IndyMac has yet
to pay back $9 billion to depositors and $25 million to general creditors.
HERA. On July 13, Secretary Paulson asked Congress to pass legislation providing authority
to place the GSEs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship or receivership with
funding from Treasury. On July 30, 2008, the government passed the Housing and Economic
Recovery Act (HERA), which replaced the GSEs’ existing regulators with the Federal Housing
Finance Agency (FHFA) and enabled the FHFA to take the GSEs into funded conservatorship
or receivership. HERA also gave Treasury authority to inject capital into the GSEs if
necessary, effectively allowing Treasury to stand behind the GSEs’ $5 trillion in combined
securities and MBS.
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Developments over the late spring/summer.
Drafting a framework. Staff at Treasury, FRB, and FRBNY engaged in a broader
effort to prepare for a more severe crisis by drafting the framework for additional
emergency authority from Congress to “resolve” a failing investment bank, and to
purchase assets or inject capital into the financial system.
During this time, FRBNY pushed JPMorgan and BONY to raise margin requirements
and limit their access to the riskier collateral in the $12 trillion tripartite repo market.
Lehman. Treasury and Fed engaged in concerted effort to induce Lehman to raise
capital or merge with a stronger partner. Lehman pursued a range of options, but
none were successful, at least not on terms attractive enough to Lehman’s
management and board. Over the summer and into September, Lehman tried and
failed to spin off a $30 billion portfolio of real estate assets, or SpinCo, as it was
commonly known.
The GSE Conservatorship. The FHFA placed Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship on
September 6, 2008. On September 7, Treasury established a line of equity with each GSE in
the amount of $100 billion and immediately injected $1 billion of capital into each. That day,
Treasury also entered into an agreement to purchase the GSEs’ MBS and began purchases
later in the month.
Lehman Weekend.
“Meeting of the families.” On Friday September 12, Geithner, Paulson and Federal
Reserve Governor Kevin Warsh, a convened the heads of 12 banks and investment
banks at the FRBNY to explore ways to prevent failures of Lehman, Merrill, and AIG.
Lehman declares bankruptcy. In the early morning hours of Monday, September
15, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy after Barclays pulled out of merger talks on
Sunday. Over the next several days, the FRBNY lent between $40 and $60 billion a day
to Lehman’s U.S. primary dealer to help facilitate a more orderly unwinding of its
approximately $67-72 billion of assets. Lehman’s London administrator seized
collateral in London.
Merrill sold to Bank of America. Around the same time that Lehman filed for
bankruptcy, Bank of America announced publicly that it had agreed to purchase
Merrill Lynch for about $50 billion.
Exemption of section 23A. On September 14, Fed approved an exemption to section 23A of
the Federal Reserve Act, allowing affiliates of banks to obtain financing from the Fed for
assets that they would have financed using repo.
Reserve Primary Fund. Money Market Funds were struggling to satisfy redemptions and
stopped buying commercial paper. This panic accelerated when the London administrator
of the Lehman bankruptcy seized collateral. On Tuesday, September 16 the Reserve Primary
Fund “broke the buck.” The fund held $785 million in Lehman commercial paper, which it
wrote down to zero within a matter of days before closing. The effect on the Reserve Primary
Fund led to a general run on prime money market funds. During the week following
Lehman’s bankruptcy, investors withdrew $230 billion from money market mutual funds.
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Loan to AIG. On September 16, FRBNY announced an $85 billion rescue package, in the form
of a revolving credit facility, for AIG, aimed at alleviating liquidity pressures derived from
collateral calls on AIG’s CDS portfolios business. In return for access to the credit line, AIG
was to post adequate and equally valued collateral and was to provide the government
senior voting preferred stock convertible into 79.9% of AIG’s common shares, held by an
independent trust for the benefit of Treasury. Any utilization of the credit facility by AIG
came with a commitment fee and penalty rate.
Swap lines with the G10. On September 16, the Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC)
delegated authority to establish swap lines to the currency subcommittee, enabling the Fed
to establish swap lines with any of the G10 banks without requiring an official vote from the
FOMC. On September 18, the Fed established swap lines with the Bank of Canada and Bank
of England, and increased its swap lines with the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Swiss
National Bank. On September 24, the Fed extended swap lines to the all the remaining
members of the G10 except New Zealand (the Fed established a swap line with New Zealand
on October 24).
TARP first request. After Lehman weekend, Paulson returned to Washington to consult
with the President on new emergency authority. On Thursday, September 18, Paulson and
Bernanke went to Congress and requested hundreds of billions of dollars for a new
emergency authority. Paulson sent Congressional leaders his preliminary draft of TARP that
weekend.
Money Market Mutual Fund Guarantee. On September 19, Treasury announced a
preliminary guarantee of prime money market funds up to $50 billion. On September 29,
Treasury officially announced a guarantee of the money market funds, which totaled
approximately $3.4 trillion.
AMLF. On September 19, 2008, the Fed announced the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper
Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) under Section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act to provide funding in the form of nonrecourse loans to U.S. depository
institutions, bank holding companies, broker-dealer subsidiaries, and U.S. branches of
foreign banks. The AMLF was meant to create a market for asset backed commercial paper.
Fed purchased Fannie and Freddie’s securities. On September 19, 2008, Fed announced
its intent to purchase short-term debt from Fannie, Freddie, and the Federal Home Loan
Banks (FHLBs). By the time that the program concluded on September 26, the FRBNY had
purchased $14.5 billion in short-term agency debt.
Goldman and Morgan Stanley become Bank Holding Companies. On September 21, the
Fed agreed to convert Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley into Bank Holding Companies, on
the condition they each immediately raised additional capital. Goldman raised an aggregate
$10 billion from Warren Buffett and a public offering. Morgan Stanley raised $9 billion from
Mitsubishi. Although we wanted to make it appear like Morgan and Goldman had received
additional protection as BHCs, both banks remained close to failure until Congress passed
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act on October 3. The EESA allowed Treasury to inject
capital into both banks and enabled them to issue new debt backed by an FDIC guarantee.
FDIC intervened in Washington Mutual. On September 25, JPMorgan bought WaMu and
took most of its liabilities, including its covered bonds and other secured debt. All of WaMu’s
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equity was wiped out. In addition, WaMu’s general creditors, senior debt holders, and
subordinated debtholders lost nearly $15 billion.
Wachovia sold to Wells Fargo. On Monday September 29, the FDIC initially agreed to sell
Wachovia to CitiGroup, invoking, for the first time in the crisis, the systemic risk exemption,
which allowed the FDIC to guarantee liabilities of the holding company. On October 2, Wells
Fargo, which had been in competition with Citi, submitted a better deal, offering to purchase
Wachovia for $7 per-share. Wells’ offer was seven times higher than Citi’s offer and did not
require FDIC assistance. Wells acquired Wachovia and none of Wachovia’s creditors suffered
losses since the FDIC never took the bank into receivership.
Swap lines with Mexico, Brazil, Korea, and Singapore. Emerging global markets,
particularly those that had relied heavily on dollar funding, began facing serious strains in
the wake of Lehman and its aftermath. Liquidity constraints in these markets caused many
of their respective sovereign currencies to fluctuate and their CDS to rise. On September 29,
the Fed established swap lines of $30 billion each for Mexico, Brazil, Korea, and Singapore.
By extending swap lines to these four countries, the Fed attempted to counteract the capital
flow reversal in these emerging markets. This action also marked the first time that the Fed
had established swap lines with any of the four banks except Mexico.
Congress passed TARP. Congress did not pass an emergency funding bill on October 1. On
October 3, however, Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, which
included the Troubled Asset Relief Program. TARP provided Treasury a total of $700 billion
to buy troubled assets, of which $350 billion was immediately available. The other $350
billion was contingent on additional Congressional approval. Treasury initially planned to
use the funding to conduct mainly asset purchases, but Paulson officially shifted Treasury’s
strategy to mainly capital injections on October 13.
CPFF. The Fed announced the creation of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility on October
7 to provide liquidity to commercial paper issuers in the event that short-term financing was
not available, intending to restart the short-term lending market. The FRBNY provided
three-month loans to a new limited liability company, the CPFF LLC, which purchased highlyrated commercial paper from eligible issuers on top of a small facility fee.
Interest rate cuts. G10 central banks announced a coordinated interest rate cut on October
8, marking the first instance that the Fed had coordinated a reduction in interest rates with
the 10 central banks.
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